Branch: Heer
Born: 3 December 1880 in Küstrin, Neumark.
Died: 4 May 1945 in Oldenburg, Holstein.
Ranks:
Generalfeldmarschall19 July
1940
Generaloberst 15 March 1938
General der Infanterie 1 March
1935
Generalleutnant 1 February
1931
Generalmajor 1 February 1929
Oberst 1 May 1925
Oberstleutnant 18 December
1920
Major 30 December 1916
Hauptmann 22 March 1912
Oberleutnant 10 September
1908
Leutnant 15 March 1898
Decorations:
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross
Commands:
Heeresgruppe Nord
Takes command on 27 August 1939
Ends command on
Heeresgruppe B
Takes command on 25 January 1945
Ends command on
Heeresgruppe Mitte
Takes command on June 1941
Ends command on
Heeresgruppe Süd
Takes command on 1942
Ends command on
Other: Personnel
Articles:
Fedor von Bock was born on 3 December 1880 and became a German
Field Marshal who served in the German army (Heer) during
the Second World War. As a leader who lectured his soldiers
about the honor of dying for the German Fatherland, he was
nicknamed Der Sterber (literally, The Dying
One). Fedor von Bock served as the commander of Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) during the Invasion of Poland in 1939, commander of Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) during the Invasion of France in 1940, and later as the
commander of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) during the attack on the Soviet
Union in 1941 his final command was that of Heeresgruppe
Süd in 1942.
Fedor von Bock is best known for commanding Operation Typhoon,
the ultimately failed attempt to capture Moscow during the
winter of 1941. The Wehrmacht offensive was slowed by stiff
Soviet resistance around Mozhaisk, and also by the Rasputitsa,
the season of rain and mud in Russia. Once the full fury
of the Russian winter struck, which was the coldest in over
50 years, the German armies quickly became unable to conduct
further combat operations, with more casualties occurring
due to the cold weather than from battle. The Soviet counteroffensive
soon drove the German army into retreat, and Fedor von Bock
who recommended an earlier withdrawal was subsequently relieved
of command by
Adolf
Hitler.
A lifelong officer in the German military, Fedor von Bock
was considered to be a very by the book general.
He also had a reputation for being a fiery lecturer, earning
him the nickname Holy Fire of Küstrin.
Fedor von Bock was not considered to be a brilliant theoretician,
but possessed a strong sense of determination, feeling that
the greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was
to die on the battlefield for the Fatherland.
A monarchist, Fedor von Bock personally despised Nazism,
and was not heavily involved in politics. However, he also
did not sympathize with plots to overthrow
Adolf
Hitler, and never filed official protests over the treatment
of civilians by the Schutzstaffel (SS). Fedor von Bock was
also uncommonly outspoken, a privilege
Adolf
Hitler extended to him only because he had been successful
in battle. Fedor von Bock along with his wife and only daughter
were killed by a strafing British fighter-bomber on 4 May
1945 as they traveled by car toward Hamburg.
Early life
Fedor von Fedor von Bock was born in Küstrin, a fortress
city on the banks of the Oder River in the Province of Brandenburg.
His full name given at birth was Moritz Albrecht Franz Friedrich
Fedor.
He was born into a Prussian Protestant aristocratic family
whose military heritage is traceable to the time of the
Hohenzollerns. His father Karl Moritz von Bock commanded
a division in the Franco-Prussian War, and was decorated
for bravery at the Battle of Sedan. His great-grandfather
served in the armies of Frederick the Great, and his grandfather
was an officer in the Prussian Army at Jena. His mother
Olga Helene Fransziska Freifrau von Falkenhayn von Bock
was of both German and Russian aristocratic heritage. Fedor
von Bock was related to
Erich
von Falkenhayn who was his father's brother-in-law.
At the age of eight, Fedor von Bock went to Berlin to study
at the Potsdam and Gross Lichterfelde Military Academy.
The education emphasized Prussian militarism, and he quickly
became adept in academic subjects such as modern languages,
mathematics, and history. He spoke fluent French, and to
a fair degree English and Russian. At an early age, and
largely due to his father, Fedor von Bock developed an unquestioned
loyalty to the state and dedication to the military profession.
This upbringing would greatly influence his actions and
decisions when he commanded armed forces during World War
II. At the age of 17, Fedor von Bock became an officer candidate
in the Imperial Foot Guards Regiment at Potsdam he received
an officer's commission a year later. He entered service
with the rank of Sekondeleutnant.
The tall, thin, narrow-shouldered Fedor von Bock had a
dry and cynical sense of humor he seldom smiled. His manner
was described as being arrogant, ambitious, and opinionated
he approached military bearing with an unbending demeanor.
While not a brilliant theoretician, Fedor von Bock was a
highly determined officer. As one of the highest ranking
officers in the Reichswehr, he often addressed graduating
cadets at his alma mater. His theme was always that the
greatest glory that could come to a German soldier was to
die for the Fatherland. He quickly earned the nickname Holy
Fire of Küstrin.
In 1905, Fedor von Bock married Mally von Reichenbach,
a young Prussian noblewoman, whom he had originally met
in Berlin. They were married in a traditional military wedding
at the Potsdam garrison. They had a daughter, born two years
after the marriage. A year later, Fedor von Bock attended
the War Academy in Berlin, and after a year's study he joined
the ranks of the General Staff. He soon joined the patriotic
Army League and become a close associate of other young
German officers such as
Walther
von Brauchitsch,
Franz
Halder, and
Gerd
von Rundstedt. In 1908, he was promoted to the rank
of Oberleutnant.
World War I
By the time World War I began in 1914, Fedor von Bock was
a Hauptmann. He served with the 4th Foot Guards Regiment as
a battalion commander in January and February 1916, and was
decorated with the coveted Pour le Mérite for bravery.
Major von Fedor von Bock was assigned as a divisional staff
officer in von Rupprecht's army group on the Western Front
and became a friend of the Crown Prince of Germany. Two days
before the Armistice, he met with Kaiser Wilhelm II at Spa,
Belgium, in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Kaiser
to return to Berlin to crush the mutiny at Kiel.
Weimar Republic
After the Treaty of Versailles was signed, limiting the German
Army to 100,000 troops, Fedor von Bock stayed on as an officer
of the post-treaty Reichswehr, and rose through the ranks.
In the 1920s, Fedor von Bock was together with Kurt von Schleicher,
Eugen Ott, and Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord a member of a secret
group known as Sondergruppe R selected by and responsible
to Hans von Seeckt that was in charge of helping Germany evade
the Part V of the Treaty of Versailles, which had disarmed
Germany.The officers of Sondergruppe R formed the liaison
with Major Bruno Ernst Buchrucker, who led the so-called Arbeits-Kommandos
(Work Commandos), which officially a labor group intended
to assist with civilian projects, but in reality were thinly
disguised soldiers that allowed Germany to exceed the limits
on troop strength set by Versailles.Buchrucker's so-called
Black Reichswehr became infamous for its practice
of murdering all those Germans whom it was suspected were
working as informers for the Allied Control Commission, which
was responsible for ensuring that Germany was in compliance
with Part V. The killings perpetrated by the Black Reichswehr
were justifed under the so-called Femegerichte (secret court)
system. These killings were ordered by the officers from Sondergruppe
R. Regarding the Femegerichte murders, Carl von Ossietzky
wrote:
Lieutenant Schulz (charged with the murder of informers
against the Black Reichswehr) did nothing but
carry out the orders given him, and that certainly Colonel
von Fedor von Bock, and probably Colonel von Schleicher
and General Seeckt, should be sitting in the dock beside
him.
Several times Fedor von Bock perjured himself in court
when he denied that the Reichswehr had anything to do with
the Black Reichswehr or the murders they had
committed. On 27 September 1923, Buckrucker ordered 4,500
men of the Black Reichswehr to assemble outside of Berlin
as the first preparatory step toward a putsch. Fedor von
Bock who was Buckrucker's contract with the Reichswehr was
enraged, and in a stormly meeting berated Buckrucker for
mobilizing the Black Reichswehr without orders. Fedor von
Bock stated the Reichswehr wanted no part in Buckrucker's
putsch and that If von Seeckt knew you were here,
he would screw his monocle into his eye and say Go
for him! Despite Fedor von Bock's orders to demobilize
at once, Buckrucker went ahead with his putsch on 30 September
1923, which ended in total failure.
In 1935,
Adolf
Hitler appointed General von Fedor von Bock as commander
of the Third Army Group. Fedor von Bock was one of the officers
not removed from his position when
Adolf
Hitler reorganized the armed forces during the phase
of German rearmament before the outbreak of World War II.
He remained a monarchist, and was a frequent visitor to
the former Kaiser's estate.
Adolf
Hitler reportedly said of him, Nobody in the world
but Von Fedor von Bock can teach soldiers to die.
Fedor von Bock himself told his troops, The ideal
soldier fulfills his duty to the utmost, obeys without even
thinking, thinks only when ordered to do so, and has as
his only desire to die the honorable death of a soldier
killed in action.
General von Fedor von Bock commanded the invasion of Vienna
in March 1938 for the Anschluss and then the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, before leading German armies into World
War II.
World War II
Invasion of Poland
By 25 August 1939, Fedor von Bock was in command of Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) in preparation for the invasion and conquest of Poland.
The objective of Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) was to destroy the Polish
forces north of the Vistula. Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) was composed
of General
Georg
von Küchler's 3rd Army, and General
Günther
von Kluge's 4th Army. These struck southward from East
Prussia and eastward across the base of the Polish Corridor,
respectively.
In just five weeks, Poland was overrun by German and Soviet
forces and Fedor von Bock had linked Germany back to East
Prussia. Following the success in Poland, Fedor von Bock
returned to Berlin to begin preparations for the upcoming
campaign in the West.
Invasion of France
Shortly after the conquest of Poland, on 12 October 1939 Fedor
von Bock was given command of Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B),
with 29½ divisions, including three armoured divisions.
These were tasked with advancing through the Low Countries
and luring the northern units of the Allied armies into a
pocket. Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) consisted of the 18th
and 6th Armies. While his units were overrunning the Netherlands,
in May 1940, Fedor von Bock attempted to call on the exiled
former Kaiser Wilhelm II at Doorn, but Fedor von Bock was
unable to gain admittance: the German troops guarding the
residence having been instructed to prevent such visits.
Fedor von Bock participated in the Armistice with France
in late June 1940. On 18 July 1940, Fedor von Bock was promoted
to the rank of Generalfeldmarschall during a reception held
by
Adolf
Hitler. For much of the summer of 1940, Fedor von Bock
alternated his time between his headquarters in Paris and
his home in Berlin. At the end of August, Army High Command
transferred Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) to East Prussia this included
Günther
von Kluge's 4th Army. On 11 September, Fedor von Bock
relinquished command of his occupation area in France to
Generalfeldmarshall
Wilhelm
Ritter von Leeb.
Invasion of Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa)
On 2 February, Fedor von Bock met with
Adolf
Hitler and questioned whether the Russians could be forced
to make peace even if the Red army was brought to battle and
defeated,
Adolf
Hitler airily assured Fedor von Bock that Germany's resources
were more than sufficient and that he was determined to fight.
In preparation for Operation Barbarossa, on 1 April 1941 Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) was re-designated as Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) in an official order
from Army High Command which defined the organization of the
invasion force. Deployed in Poland, Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) was
one of the three army formations which were to lead the invasion
of the Soviet Union. It included the 4th and 9th Armies, the
3rd and 2nd Panzer Armies and Luftflotte 2. On the left flank
of Fedor von Bock's Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) was Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North),
commanded by
Wilhelm
Ritter von Leeb on the right flank was Heeresgruppe Süd,
commanded by
Gerd
von Rundstedt.
Initially, the main objective of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) was
to follow Napoleon's route north of the Pripyat Marshes
straight to Moscow. However, against the strong vocal opposition
of von Fedor von Bock,
Adolf
Hitler altered the original invasion plan, one of many
changes he would make, both before the invasion and after
it had already begun. Von Fedor von Bock opposed any changes
to the invasion plan of Moscow, because he wanted to occupy
Moscow as soon as he could, hopefully before the onset of
cold weather, so that his troops would be in warm quarters
during the winter. The failure to do this caused the failure
of the whole Soviet campaign.
The new task of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) was to drive towards
the cities of Minsk and Smolensk, and in great encirclements
destroy the Soviet Armies stationed there. Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) would then drive toward Leningrad, and along with
Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North) destroy the remnants of the Soviet Armies
in the Baltic states and seize valuable ports for the supply
of the campaign. Only after the bulk of the Soviet army
was destroyed in Western Russia would Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre)
then drive toward the Soviet capital.
Adolf
Hitler made this change conscious of the fact that despite
capturing Moscow, Napoleon was defeated because he did not
destroy the Russian army.
At 03:15 on 22 June 1941, the first shots of Operation
Barbarossa were fired Germany invaded the Soviet Union
without formally declaring the war. At the outset of the
campaign Fedor von Bock remained at his desk in his headquarters
waiting for the first reports from the front. Within an
hour of the attack, the first reports began to arrive at
Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) headquarters. Elements of
Heinz
Guderian's force had crossed the Bug River and were
bypassing the city of Brest-Litovsk.
Hermann
Hoth's tanks were heading for Grodno on the Nieman River
to seize the important river crossings. Several reconnaissance
units from the 4th and 9th Armies had already crossed the
Bug and Desna Rivers.
At 07:00, Fedor von Bock flew from Posen to an advance
airfield near the headquarters of XIII Infantry Corps. There,
Lieutenant General Erich Jaschke gave Fedor von Bock a summary
of the progress of the invasion. Following this meeting,
Fedor von Bock visited
Heinz
Guderian's forward command post at Bokhaly.
Heinz
Guderian's Chief of staff Colonel Kurt Freiherr von
Liebenstein greeted Fedor von Bock, as
Heinz
Guderian had already crossed the Bug River several hours
earlier with the 18th Panzer Division. Fedor von Bock then
visited Joachim Lemelsen, who gave an agitated report from
the front. The roads on the Soviet side of the Bug River
were already becoming too soft to support the weight of
tanks. As a result, several tank columns had to be rerouted
to cross a bridge farther south at Koden. This rerouting
caused severe traffic congestion, as some ten thousand vehicles
converged on this single crossing. Despite this, the first
day of the invasion had been spectacularly successful. Soviet
resistance was reported as being light and complete surprise
was achieved. All along the front rapid progress was being
made.
On the second day of Barbarossa, Fedor von Bock crossed
the Bug River. Escorted by Major General Gustav Schmidt,
he made his way to a company command post from where he
observed German artillery firing on Soviet positions near
Brest-Litovsk. Despite the fact that German panzers had
already crossed deep into Soviet territory, the defenders
of the city were holding out stubbornly. Later that day
Fedor von Bock was presented with reports that Soviet resistance
was stiffening all long the front, especially on
Heinz
Guderian's southern flank. Meanwhile,
Hermann
Hoth's forces were advancing with much more ease through
the Baltic states and Belarus. The first two days of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) advance proved to be highly successful.
Hermann
Hoth's armies advanced so quickly that Fedor von Bock
immediately contacted
Walther
von Brauchitsch, requesting the bypassing of Minsk in
favor of attacking toward Vitebsk so that a drive could
be made for Moscow. Initially, the change in plan was accepted
but it was soon overruled by
Adolf
Hitler, who favored the encirclement and destruction
of the large Soviet armies near Minsk. Fedor von Bock wrote
in his diary:
The envelopment of Minsk is not decisive. Besides, I am
sure that the enemy expects us to attack Minsk, the next
natural objective, and will concentrate defense forces there.
Differences between Fedor von Bock's strategic intent and
the intent of High Command repeatedly surfaced. Fedor von
Bock continued to favor a direct drive toward Moscow, bypassing
Soviet armies and leaving them to be destroyed by infantry,
which advanced well behind tank columns. Fedor von Bock
argued that if encirclement was truly necessary then instead
of diverting his tanks north and south to encircle and destroy
smaller Soviet armies, a larger encirclement should be made
eastward toward the Dvina-Dnieper River basins.
Adolf
Hitler decided against this plan, and insisted that
the pockets containing Soviet armies must be destroyed before
advancing deeper into Russia.
Fedor von Bock, enraged by this decision, was quoted as
saying:
We are permitting our greatest chance of success to escape
us by this restriction placed on our armor!
He hesitantly gave the order to abandon the drive toward
Vitebsk and assist in the destruction of the pockets. On
25 June, Fedor von Bock moved his headquarters from Posen
to Kobryn, a town about 15 mi (24 km) northeast of Brest-Litovsk.
On 30 June, the 4th and 9th Armies met each other near Slonim,
trapping thousands of Soviet soldiers. However, many Soviet
soldiers managed to escape eastward. Fedor von Bock soon
gave the order to disengage from the encirclement and prepare
for a full-scale drive to the east. This order once again
caused a confrontation between Fedor von Bock and
Walther
von Brauchitsch.
On 3 July, Fedor von Bock's forces were once again advancing
eastward, with
Heinz
Guderian's tanks crossing the Beresina and
Hermann
Hoth's tanks crossing the Duna. This day marked the
furthest distance covered by Fedor von Bock's troops in
a single day, with over 100 mi (160 km) traveled. Four days
later,
Heinz
Guderian's tanks crossed the Dnieper, the last great
obstacle before Smolensk. However,
Heinz
Guderian was soon ordered by
Günther
von Kluge to withdraw back across the river. Fedor von
Bock soon reversed this order, and
Heinz
Guderian was allowed to re-cross the river. Fedor von
Bock protested
Günther
von Kluge's actions to High Command, to no avail.On
11 July, Fedor von Bock moved his headquarters again to
Borisov, a Soviet town near the Beresina River.
Operation Typhoon
On 9 September, Army High Command instructed Fedor von Bock
to prepare an operational order for the assault on Moscow.
Operation Typhoon was the code-name given to this new attack,
which was to begin no later then 30 September. Fedor von Bock
carefully supervised the planning and preparation of the operation,
and a few days later it was approved by the High Command.
As part of the preparation for Operation Typhoon, Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) would be reinforced and replenished with men and vehicles
it would be composed of three infantry armies (the 2nd,
4th, and 9th) and three tank armies (2nd, 3rd, and 4th Panzers).
Colonel General
Erich
Hoepner would command the 4th Panzer Army, while the
former two were outgrowths of
Hermann
Hoth's and
Heinz
Guderian's original Panzer Groups. The replenishment
of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) for Operation Typhoon caused it to
increase greatly in size: with almost 1.5 million soldiers,
it was now larger than it was at the outset of Operation
Barbarossa. Fedor von Bock spent most of the remainder of
September on inspection tours of his reinforced Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre). On one occasion, Fedor von Bock along with
Albert
Kesselring flew over Moscow.
On 29 September, Fedor von Bock held a conference with
his senior commanders
Adolf
Strauss,
Hermann
Hoth,
Günther
von Kluge, Weichs,
Erich
Hoepner,
Heinz
Guderian, and
Albert
Kesselring. During the meeting the main operational
plan was reviewed, with Fedor von Bock again stressing that
Moscow must be taken by 7 November, before the onset of
the Russian winter, and to coincide with the anniversary
of the Russian Revolution. The following day, Operation
Typhoon began with attacks from
Heinz
Guderian's and
Hermann
Hoth's armored forces. Several days later, the infantry
armies began to move toward Moscow. With less than 100 miles
between the most advanced troops and Moscow, Fedor von Bock
estimated that his troops would enter the city in three
to four weeks.
Almost immediately, Fedor von Bock's forces encountered
stiff Soviet resistance on the road to Moscow. The previous
diversions of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) allowed the Soviets to
reinforce the area between Smolensk and Moscow with the
Russian 3rd, 10th, 13th, and 20th Armies, as well as elements
of three other armies. German forces were outnumbered almost
two to one. However, the superior tactics and training of
the Wehrmacht along with an element of surprise resulted
in significant gains despite the increasingly desperate
measures employed by the Russians to stop the advance.
The 2nd Panzer Army along with the XLVIII Panzer Corps
attacked important rail junctions near Oryol and Bryansk.
Erich
Hoepner's 4th Panzer Army soon crossed the Desna River
and gained access to deep Russian territory. Meanwhile,
Hermann
Hoth's 3. Panzerarmee (3rd Panzer Army) struck toward Rzhev on the Volga
River.
On 3 October, Guderian's forces captured Orel and subsequently
gained access to a paved highway which led to Moscow, some
180 mi (290 km) away. Meanwhile, elements of the 2nd Panzer
Army reported that they had bypassed Bryansk and were heading
toward Karachev. Fedor von Bock ordered
Heinz
Guderian to press on toward Tula, but within hours this
order had been reversed by High Command. The reversal of
the order called for
Heinz
Guderian to attack Bryansk where along with Vyazma two
massive encirclements of Soviet forces were occurring. Fedor
von Bock argued that the area between Orel and Tula remained
relatively free of Soviet forces and that Tula could be
captured within hours. Ultimately, Fedor von Bock agreed
to divert
Heinz
Guderian's tanks toward Bryansk.
Cold rain soon began to fall over the northern sectors
of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) front, and the roads soon turned into
quagmires as part of the Rasputitsa. Virtually the entire
front became stuck the only vehicles capable of negotiating
the mud were tanks and other tracked vehicles. However,
these moved at a snail's pace (sometimes less than 2 mi
(3.2 km) per day), and fuel consumption soared. This further
aggravated the problem of already poor supply lines. Trucks
soon became stuck in the mud, as soldiers tried desperately
to free them. As the temperature continued to drop,
Heinz
Guderian requested a supply of winter clothing and anti-freeze
for the vehicles. However, the increase in partisan activity
behind the lines, along with the deteriorating weather conditions,
made it increasingly difficult for these vital supplies
to reach the front. In one two-day period, partisans made
over sixty attacks on German truck convoys, outposts, and
railway lines.
Slight improvements in the weather soon made it possible
for Fedor von Bock's forces to continue to seal the pockets
around Bryansk and Vyazma. The dual encirclements of Soviet
forces around Vyazma and Bryansk yielded some of the largest
Soviet casualties since the beginning of Operation Barbarossa:
some 650,000 prisoners were taken during these two encirclements,
after which the Soviet armies facing Fedor von Bock's Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) no longer had the advantage of superior numbers.
The weather soon deteriorated again, with the roads once
more turning into impassable, muddy quagmires. Since 30
September, Fedor von Bock had lost some 35,000 men, 250
tanks and artillery pieces, and several hundred other vehicles,
many of which were mired in the mud. Fuel and ammunition
supplies became dangerously low. Despite these problems,
the advance toward Moscow continued as
Adolf
Hitler became increasingly impatient. When advance units
of the 4th Panzer Army reached Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets,
German forces were within 40 mi (64 km) of Moscow.
Heinz
Guderian's advance in the south was much slower. An
attempt by his forces to capture Tula had failed, with considerable
losses of men and tanks. However, other units captured Stalinogorsk
and Venev, indicating the possibility of bypassing Tula.
As Fedor von Bock's forces pressed on toward Moscow, panic
struck in the capital. Hundreds of thousands of civilians
began to evacuate the city while others were forced into
emergency volunteer units. Martial law was instituted as
looting and pillaging of deserted stores increased. Marshal
Semyon Timoshenko was relieved of command in favor of Georgy
Zhukov, who had been organizing the defense of Leningrad.
The main bulk of the Soviet government was evacuated to
Kuibyshev, 500 mi (800 km) southeast of Moscow however,
Stalin remained in the capital after being reassured by
Zhukov that the capital would not fall.
The further Fedor von Bock's forces advanced, the stiffer
Soviet resistance became. The paved roads leading to Moscow
became craters under constant Russian artillery fire, rendering
them impassable. This forced the German troops into the
mud and Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) soon became stuck once again.
The goal of capturing Moscow by mid October could no longer
be achieved. However, the sheer weight of the German advance
could not be fully stopped, and on 21 October units of the
9th Army captured Kalinin.
As November arrived the mud soon turned into ice as temperatures
dropped to -20 °F. While the ground hardened sufficiently
enough to support vehicles, the cold weather added to the
miseries of the German soldiers as many had not received
winter clothing. Frostbite soon took its toll many soldiers
were severely affected and had to be evacuated.
On 20 November, Fedor von Bock moved his field headquarters
to an advanced forward position near the front lines. There
he visited an artillery command post, where he could see
the buildings of Moscow through his field glasses. Several
days later, German forces crossed the Moscow-Volga Canal
and reached Khimki but soon fell back due to Soviet resistance.
On 29 November, elements of the 4th Panzer Army reached
the western suburbs of Moscow. On 4 December, units of the
2nd Army reached Kuntsevo, a western suburb of Moscow. Several
units of
Heinz
Guderian's army bypassed Kolomna and reached the Moscow
River. Meanwhile, the 3. Panzerarmee (3rd Panzer Army) once again fought
into Khimki. These were the last advances made by Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) under Fedor von Bock's command.
On 6 December, with the temperature at -50 °F, fresh
Russian troops commanded by Zhukov launched a huge counterattack.
All along the front near Moscow German troops retreated,
destroying whatever equipment they could not salvage. Several
days later, High Command ordered a halt to all offensive
operations. Fedor von Bock wrote in his diary:
All along, I demanded of Army High Command the authority
to strike down the enemy when he was wobbling. We could
have finished the enemy last summer. We could have destroyed
him completely. Last August, the road to Moscow was open
we could have entered the Bolshevik capital in triumph and
in summery weather. The high military leadership of the
Fatherland made a terrible mistake when it forced my army
group to adopt a position of defense last August. Now all
of us are paying for that mistake.
By 13 December, German forces had retreated more than 50
mi (80 km) from the capital. On 18 December, Fedor von Bock
was relieved of his command of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre). The official
pretext of this decision was health problems. However, this
was just one case out of some 40 high-ranking officers being
relieved of their command following the failure to capture
Moscow. Fedor von Bock's command of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre) marked
the closest the German army ever got to Moscow never again
would the Soviet capital be threatened.
Operation Blue
When Fedor von Bock asked for permission to withdraw his exhausted
troops in December 1941, he was dismissed from his post as
Commander of Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Centre), to be reassigned to lead
Heeresgruppe Süd in January 1942, when Generalfeldmarshall
Walter
von Reichenau died of a heart attack.
On 28 June 1942, Fedor von Bock's offensive split the Russian
front into fragments on either side of Kursk. Three armies
(Weich's 2nd Army,
Hermann
Hoth's 4th Panzer, and Paulus' 6th Army) along with
11 Panzer Divisions fanned out toward Voronezh and the Don
River. Paulus' Panzer Divisions reached the Don on either
side of Voronezh on 5 July. The Russians created a Voronezh
Front under Vatutin, who reported directly to Moscow.
Fedor von Bock wanted to eliminate Vatutin's forces before
extending his own flank too deeply into the yawning void
created by the strength and speed of the German offensive.
Adolf Hitler
was not pleased with Fedor von Bock's plan to delay the
push toward Stalingrad. On 15 July,
Adolf
Hitler would blame him for the failure of Operation
Braunschweig, the second part of the German offensive
in Russia, and retire him indefinitely. The command of Army
Group South was given to Maximilian von Weichs.
While privately opposing the atrocities being committed
against Soviet civilians, Fedor von Bock never protested
directly to
Adolf
Hitler, although at one time, he had a subordinate file
a formal complaint (Meine Herren, ich stelle fest:
Der Feldmarschall von Fedor von Bock hat protestiert!
gentlemen, I state: The field marshal von Fedor von
Bock has protested).His nephew, Henning von Tresckow,
tried in vain to win him for the military resistance against
the
Adolf
Hitler regime. When his staff officers planned the assassination
of
Adolf
Hitler during a visit to his Army Group, Fedor von Bock
intervened.On the other hand, he did not report the conspirators
either.
One of the reasons for Fedor von Bock's dismissal is believed
to have been his expressed interest in supporting the Russian
Liberation Movement, which
Adolf
Hitler was categorically against.
As an involuntarily retired Field Marshal, Fedor von Bock
felt he was made a scapegoat for the problems of Stalingrad.
He was approached to join a coup against
Adolf
Hitler, but he believed any such move not supported by
Heinrich Himmler who controlled the Waffen-SS was bound to
fail he refused to move against the Führer.
With the Russians closing in on Berlin in 1945, Fedor von
Bock was informed by
Erich
von Manstein that Grand Admiral
Karl
Dönitz was forming a new government in Hamburg. Fedor
von Bock started off for that city immediately, perhaps hoping
for a new command. On 4 May 1945, only a week before the war's
end in Europe, Fedor von Bock's car was strafed on the Kiel
road by a British fighter-bomber he was killed along with
his wife and daughter.
At age 64, Fedor von Fedor von Bock became the only one
of
Adolf
Hitler's Field Marshals to die from enemy fire.
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