Branch: Heer
Born: 24 November 1887 in Berlin, Germany.
Died: 9 June 1973 in Irschenhausen, Germany.
Ranks:
Generalfeldmarschall 1 August
1942
Generaloberst 7 March 1942
General der Infanterie 1 June
1940
Generalleutnant 1 April 1938
Generalmajor 1 October 1936
Oberst 1 December 1933
Oberstleutnant 1 April 1931
Major February 1928
Hauptmann 24 July 1915
Oberleutnant 19 June 1914
Leutnant 27 January 1907
Fähnrich 6 March 1906
Decorations:
Commands:
Other: Personnel
Articles:
Erich von Manstein was born on 24 November 1887 and became
a field marshal in World War II. He became one of the most
prominent commanders of Germany's World War II armed forces
(Wehrmacht). During World War II he attained the rank of Field
Marshal (Generalfeldmarschall) and was held in high esteem
by his fellow officers as one of the Wehrmacht's best military
strategists.
He was the initiator and one of the planners of the Ardennes
offensive alternative in the invasion of France in 1940. He
received acclaim from the German leadership for the victorious
battles of Perekop Isthmus, Kerch, Sevastopol and Kharkov.
He commanded the failed relief effort at Stalingrad and the
Cherkassy pocket evacuation. He was dismissed from service
by
Adolf Hitler
in March 1944, due to his frequent clashes with
Adolf
Hitler over military strategy. In his memoirs, Verlorene
Siege 1955, translated into English as Lost Victories, he
is critical of
Adolf
Hitler above all for denying the Army flexible defensive
manoeuverability and for over-reliance on his will, and critical
of the attempt by other military officers on
Adolf
Hitler's life.
In 1949, he was tried in Hamburg for war crimes and was convicted
of neglecting to protect civilian lives and using scorched
earth tactics which denied vital food supplies to the local
population. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison, later
reduced to 12, but he only served 4 years before being released.
After release from a British prison in 1953, he became a military
advisor to the West German Government. His self-serving memoirs
largely contributed to the myth of clean Wehrmacht, and only
years later scholars unveiled Erich von Manstein's full involvement
in atrocities and Holocaust in the East during the war.
Early life
Erich von Manstein was born Fritz Erich Georg Eduard von Lewinski
in Berlin, the tenth child of a Prussian aristocrat, artillery
general Eduard von Lewinski 1829 to 1906, and Helene von Sperling
1847 to 1910. His father's family was of partial Polish origin
- Brochwicz coat of arms (Brochwicz III). Hedwig von Sperling
1852 to 1925, Helene's younger sister, married Lieutenant
General Georg Erich von Manstein 1844 to 1913. The couple
were not able to have children, thus it was decided that this
tenth, unborn child would be adopted by his uncle and aunt.
When he was born, the Lewinskis sent a telegram to the Erich
von Mansteins which stated: You got a healthy boy today. Mother
and child well. Congratulations.
Not only were both Erich von Manstein's biological and adoptive
father Prussian generals, but his mother's brother and both
his grandfathers had also been Prussian generals (one of them,
Gustav, leading a corps in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870
to 1871. In addition, he was also a nephew of
Paul
von Hindenburg, the future Generalfeldmarschall and President
of Germany, whose wife Gertrud was a sister of Hedwig and
Helene. Thus, his career in the Prussian Army was assured
from birth. He attended the Imperial Lyzeum, a catholic gymnasium
in Strasbourg 1894 to 1899. He spent six years in the cadet
corps 1900 to 1906, in Plön and Groß-Lichterfelde
and joined the Third Foot Guards Regiment (Garde zu Fuß)
in March 1906 as an ensign. He was promoted to Lieutenant
in January 1907, and in October 1913, entered the Prussian
War Academy.
World War I
During World War I, Erich von Manstein served on both the
German Western Front 1914 Belgium/France 1916 Attack on Verdun,
1917 to 1918 Champagne and the Eastern Front 1915 North Poland,
1915 to 1916 Serbia, 1917 Estonia. In Poland, he was severely
wounded in November 1914. He returned to duty in 1915, was
promoted to captain and remained as a staff officer until
the end of the war. In 1918, he volunteered for the staff
position in the Frontier Defence Force in Breslau (Wroclaw)
and served there until 1919.
Inter-war era
Erich von Manstein married Jutta Sibylle von Loesch, the daughter
of a Silesian landowner in 1920. She died in 1966. They had
three children: a daughter named Gisela, and two sons, Gero
31 December 1922 and Rüdiger. Their elder son Gero, serving
as a Lieutenant in the Wehrmacht, died on the battlefield
in the northern sector of the Eastern Front on 29 October
1942.
Erich von Manstein stayed in the armed forces after World
War I. In the 1920s, he participated in the formation of the
Reichswehr, the German Army of the Weimar Republic restricted
to 100,000 men by the Versailles Treaty. He was appointed
company commander in 1920 and later battalion commander in
1922. In 1927 he was promoted to Major and began serving with
the General Staff, visiting other countries to learn about
their military facilities. In 1933 the National Socialist
Party rose to power in Germany thus ending the Weimar period.
The new regime renounced the Versailles Treaty and proceeded
with large scale rearmament and expansion of the military.
On 1 July 1935, Erich von Manstein was made the Head of Operations
Branch of the Army General Staff (Generalstab des Heeres),
part of the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres). During
his tenure Erich von Manstein was responsible for the development
of Germany's first war plan against France or Czechoslovakia,
which was titled Fall Rot (Case Red). It was also during this
time when Erich von Manstein came in contact with a group
of officers around
Heinz
Guderian and Oswald Lutz, who advocated drastic changes
in warfare with utilising the new Panzer as an independent
weapon. However officers like
Ludwig
Beck, Chief of the Army General Staff, were against such
drastic changes, and therefore Erich von Manstein proposed
the development of
Sturmgeschütze,
self-propelled assault guns that would provide heavy direct-fire
support to infantry, as an alternative to the Panzers. This
solution was more preferable for conservative commanders like
Ludwig
Beck. In World War II, the resulting StuG series proved
to be one of the most successful and cost-effective German
weapons.
He was promoted on 1 October 1936, becoming the Deputy Chief
of Staff (Oberquartiermeister I) to General
Ludwig
Beck. On 4 February 1938, with the fall of
Werner
von Fritsch, Erich von Manstein was transferred to the
command of the 18th Infantry Division in Liegnitz, Silesia
with the rank of Generalleutnant. In late July 1938, Erich
von Manstein wrote to
Ludwig
Beck telling him that he shared
Ludwig
Beck concerns about a premature war if Germany went ahead
with an attack on Czechoslovakia planned for 1 October, but
urged
Ludwig
Beck not to go ahead with his plan to resign in protest,
instead urging his him to place his faith in the Führer.
On April 20, 1939 to celebrate
Adolf
Hitler's 50th birthday, Erich von Manstein delivered a
speech, in which he praised
Adolf
Hitler as a leader sent by God to save Germany, and warned
the hostile world that if it kept erecting ramparts around
Germany to block the way of the German people towards their
future, then he would be quite happy to see the world plunged
into another world war. Giving speeches on the birthday of
the head of state was not in the German Army tradition, and
for
Adolf Hitler's
birthdays, no officer was required to give one with 42% of
officers choosing to stick with tradition during the lavish
celebrations of
Adolf
Hitler's 50th birthday. The rise of officers such as Erich
von Manstein was a part of broader tendency of technocratic
officers who were usually ardent National Socialists to come
to the fore. The Israeli historian Omer Bartov wrote about
the Army's technocratic officers and their relationship to
National Socialism that:
The combined gratification of personal ambitions, technological
obsessions and nationalist aspirations greatly enhanced their
identification with
Adolf
Hitler's regime as individuals, professionals, representatives
of a caste and leaders of a vast conscript army. Men such
as
Ludwig
Beck and
Heinz
Guderian, Erich von Manstein and
Erwin
Rommel,
Karl
Dönitz and
Albert
Kesserlring,
Erhard
Milch and
Ernst
Udet cannot be described as mere soldiers strictly devoted
to their profession, rearmament and the autonomy of the military
establishment while remaining indifferent to and detached
from Nazi rule and ideology. The many points of contact between
Adolf Hitler
and his young generals were thus important elements in the
integration of the Wehrmacht into the Third Reich, in stark
contradiction of its image as a haven from Nazism
World War II
Poland
On 18 August 1939, in preparation for Fall Weiss, the German
invasion of Poland, Erich von Manstein was appointed Chief
of Staff to
Gerd
von Rundstedt's Army Group South. Here he worked along
with
Gerd
von Rundstedt's Chief of Operations, Colonel Günther
Blumentritt in the development of the operational plan.
Gerd
von Rundstedt's accepted Erich von Manstein's plan calling
for the concentration of the majority of the army group's
armoured units into
Walther
von Reichenau's 10th Army, with the objective of a decisive
breakthrough which would lead to the encirclement of Polish
forces west of the Vistula River. In Erich von Manstein's
plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South,
Wilhelm
List's 14th Army and
Johannes
Blaskowitz's 8th Army, were to provide the flank support
for
Walther
von Reichenau's armoured thrust towards Warsaw, the Polish
capital. Privately, Erich von Manstein was lukewarm about
the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep
Poland as a buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union. He
also worried about an Allied attack on the West Wall once
the Polish campaign started, thus drawing Germany into a two-front
war.
Erich von Manstein took part in conference on 22 August 1939
where
Adolf
Hitler underlined to his commanders the need for the physical
destruction of Poland as a nation. After the war he would
claim in his memoirs that he didn't recognise this as policy
of extermination against the Poles. Benoît Lemay and
Pierce Heyward in their book Erich von Manstein,
Adolf
Hitler's Master Strategist write that contrary to Erich
von Manstein's claims he was perfectly aware of the policy
of extermination towards Poles.
Launched on 1 September 1939, the invasion began successfully.
In Army Group South's area of responsibility, armoured units
of the 10th Army pursued the retreating Poles, giving them
no time to set up a defence. The 8th Army prevented the isolated
Polish troop concentrations in Lódz, Radom and Poznan
from merging into a cohesive force. Deviating from the original
plan that called for heading straight for the Vistula and
then proceeding to Warsaw, Erich von Manstein persuaded
Gerd
von Rundstedt to encircle the Polish units in the Radom
area. The plan succeeded, clearing the bulk of Polish resistance
from the southern approach to Warsaw.
France
On 27 September 1939, Warsaw formally surrendered, although
isolated pockets of resistance remained. That same day,
Adolf
Hitler ordered the Army High Command, led by General
Franz
Halder, to develop a plan for action in the west against
France and the Low Countries. The different plans that the
General Staff suggested were given to Erich von Manstein and
his staff, who, with
Gerd
von Rundstedt's approval, formalised an alternative plan
for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow). This plan received
Adolf
Hitler's attention in February 1940 and finally his agreement.
By late October, the bulk of the German Army was redeployed
to the west. Erich von Manstein was made Chief of Staff of
Gerd
von Rundstedt's Heeresgruppe A (Army Group A) in western
Germany. Like many of the army's younger officers, Erich von
Manstein opposed the initial plan for Fall Gelb, criticising
it for its lack of ability to deliver strategic results and
the uninspired use of the armoured forces, which may have
come from OKH's inability to influence
Adolf
Hitler's planning. Erich von Manstein pointed out that
a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, with the attack directed
through Belgium, was something the Allies expected, as they
were already moving strong forces into the area. Bad weather
in the area caused the attack to be cancelled several times
and eventually delayed into the spring.
During the autumn, Erich von Manstein, with the informal cooperation
of
Heinz
Guderian, developed his own plan he suggested that the
panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes
where no one would expect them, then establish bridgeheads
on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel.
The Germans would thus cut off the French and Allied armies
in Belgium and Flanders. Erich von Manstein's proposal also
contained a second thrust, outflanking the Maginot Line, which
would have allowed the Germans to force any future defensive
line much further south. This second thrust would perhaps
have avoided the need for the Fall Rot (Case Red) second stage
of the Battle of France. The plan was after the event nicknamed
Sichelschnitt (sickle cut).
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht originally rejected the proposal.
Franz
Halder had Erich von Manstein removed from
Gerd
von Rundstedt's headquarters and sent to the east to command
the 38th Army Corps. But
Adolf
Hitler, looking for a more aggressive plan, approved a
modified version of Erich von Manstein's ideas, after details
of the plan had been leaked to him. This plan is today known
as the Erich von Manstein Plan. This modified version, formulated
by
Franz
Halder, did not contain the second thrust. Erich von Manstein
and his corps played a minor role during the operations in
France, serving under
Günther
von Kluge's 4th Army. However, it was his corps which
helped to achieve the first breakthrough during Fall Rot,
east of Amiens, and was the first to reach and cross the River
Seine. The invasion of France was an outstanding military
success and Erich von Manstein was promoted to full general
and awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for suggesting
the plan.
Operation Seelöwe
Erich von Manstein was a proponent of the German invasion
Great Britain, named Operation Seelöwe. He considered
the operation risky but necessary. It was planned that his
corps was to be shipped from Boulogne to Bexhill over the
English Channel. However, since the Luftwaffe failed to decisively
beat the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain, Operation
Seelöwe was cancelled. For the rest of 1940, Erich von
Manstein, with little to do, spent most of the time in Paris
or at home.
Operation Barbarossa
In early 1941, the German High Command commenced with the
planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, codenamed Operation
Barbarossa. In February 1941, Erich von Manstein was appointed
commander of the 56th Panzer Corps and one of the 250 commanders
to be briefed for the upcoming major offensive. His corps
was under the command of General
Erich
Hoepner in
Wilhelm
Ritter von Leeb's Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group North).
The Army Group was tasked with approaching through the Baltic
States and then advancing on Leningrad. Erich von Manstein
arrived only 6 days prior to the launch of the offensive at
the front. Operation Barbarossa then commenced on 22 June
1941 with a massive German attack along the whole front-line
Erich von Manstein's corps was tasked to advance to the Dvina
River together with the
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt's XXXXI Panzerkorps (XLI Panzer Corps), securing
the vital bridges over the river there. Erich von Manstein's
corps was able to advance rapidly. The Soviets mounted a number
of counterattacks, but those were aimed against
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt's Corps, leading to the Battle of Raseiniai.
After an advance of 315 km, Erich von Manstein reached the
Dvina River in just 100 hours. Being ahead of the rest of
the Army Group, he was subject to a number of determined Soviet
counterattacks, which he was able to fend off. After
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt's corps closed in, they were now tasked to encircle
the Soviet formations around Luga in a pincer movement. Again
having penetrated deep into the Soviet lines with unprotected
flanks, his corps was the target of a Soviet counteroffensive
at Soltsy by the Soviet 11th Army, commanded by Nikolai Vatutin.
During this attack from 15 July on, Erich von Manstein's spearhead
unit, the 8th Panzer Division, was cut off. Although it was
able to fight its way free, it was badly mauled and the Soviets
succeeded in halting Erich von Manstein's advance at Luga.
Erich von Manstein then received 2 more infantry divisions
as reinforcement under his disposal, while
Georg-Hans
Reinhardt was closing the encirclement on his own. On
12 August the Soviets launched a large counteroffensive with
the 11th and 34th Army against Heeresgruppe Nord (Army Group
North), cutting off 3 whole divisions at Staraya Russa. Erich
von Manstein was tasked to relieve them. His offensive led
to a major Soviet defeat when he was able to encircle 5 Soviet
divisions on his relief mission. His opponent, General Kuzma
M. Kachanov of the 34th Army, was subsequently executed. Erich
von Manstein then was tasked to advance to the east on Demyansk.
On 12 September, when he was near the city, he was informed
that he will take over 11th Army of Army Group South in the
Ukraine.
Crimea and the Battle of Sevastopol
In September 1941, Erich von Manstein was appointed commander
of the 11th Army. Its previous commander, Colonel-General
Eugen Ritter von Schobert, had perished when his plane landed
in a Russian minefield. The 11th Army was tasked with invading
the Crimea, capturing Sevastopol and pursuing enemy forces
on the flank of Army Group South during its advance into Russia.
His forces were able to achieve a fast breakthrough during
the first days, although against heavy Soviet resistance.
After most of the neck of the Perekop Isthmus was taken, Erich
von Manstein's forces were substantially reduced, leaving
him only with 6 German divisions and the Romanians. He now
had to take the rest of the Perekop Isthmus. After accomplishing
this task, his forces were ably to spread out on the Crimea
peninsula quickly. Simferopol was entered on 1 November and
Kerch was taken by 16 November. Only the city of Sevastopol
was now still in Soviet hands.
Erich von Manstein's probing attack on the city failed, and
with insufficient forces to storm the city left, he ordered
an investment of the city. By 17 December he launched another
offensive into the city, which failed. Just over a week later,
on 26 December 1941, the Soviets landed on the Kerch Straits,
and on 30 December executed another landing near Feodosiya.
Only a hurried withdrawal from the Kerch Straits, in contravention
of Erich von Manstein's orders, by 46 Infantry Division under
General Hans Graf von Sponecks command prevented a collapse
of the eastern part of the Crimea, although the division lost
most of its heavy equipment. This situation forced Erich von
Manstein to cancel a resumption of the attack on Sevastopol
and send most of his forces east to destroy the Soviet bridgehead.
The Soviets were in an superior position regarding men and
material, and were therefore pushed by Stalin to conduct further
offensives, which were thwarted by the 11th Army in heavy
fighting. The situation was stabilised by late April 1942.
Operation Trappenjagd, launched on 8 May 1942, aimed at expelling
the Russian forces from the Kerch Peninsula. After feinting
against the north, the 11th army attacked south, and the Soviets
were soon reduced to fleeing for the Kerch Straits. Three
Soviet armies (44th, 47th and 51st), 21 divisions, 176,000
men, 347 tanks and nearly 3,500 guns were lost. The remains
of the force were evacuated and Trappenjagd was completed
successfully on 18 May. German losses were only 3,397 men
while the Soviets were able to save only 37,000 out of 212,000
men through evacuation.
With months delay Erich von Manstein turned his attention
once more towards the capture of Sevastopol, a battle in which
Germany used some of the largest guns ever built. Along with
large numbers of regular artillery pieces, super-heavy 600
mm mortars and the 800 mm Dora railway gun were brought in
for the assault. The furious barrage began on the morning
of 7 June 1942, and all of the resources of the Luftwaffe's
Luftflotte 4, commanded by
Wolfram
von Richthofen, descended on their targets, continuing
for five days before the main assault began.
11th Army was able to gain ground during mid-June, although
its forces suffered considerable attrition. To keep the momentum
and before the German summer offensive of 1942 would hamper
Erich von Manstein's reinforcements and supply situation he
ordered a surprise attack for 29 June. This attack, supported
by amphibious landings, was a success and the Soviet lines
crumbled. On 1 July German forces entered the city while the
Soviets conducted a costly evacuation, and by 4 July the city
was in German hands.
Adolf
Hitler promoted Erich von Manstein subsequently to Generalfeldmarschall.
During the Crimea Campaign, Erich von Manstein was involved
atrocities against the Soviet Union, especially with the killing
squads of Einsatzgruppe D. On September 8, 1941, Otto Ohlendorf
of Einsatzgruppe D, which travelled in the wake of Erich von
Manstein's 11th Army reported that relations with the 11th
Army were excellent. Erich von Manstein's command provided
Einsatzgruppe D with the vehicles, gas, and drivers that allowed
Einsatzgruppe D to move around plus military police to cordon
off areas where Einsatzgruppe D planned to shoot Jews in order
to prevent anyone from escaping. This way Erich von Manstein
helped Einsatzgruppe D to exterminate the Jewish population
of the Crimea. A Captain Ulrich Gunzert, after watching Einsatzgruppe
D massacre a group of Jewish women and children, was shocked
by what he had seen and went to Erich von Manstein to ask
him to do something to stop the massacres. Erich von Manstein
told Captain Gunzert to forget what he had seen, and to focus
on fighting the Red Army instead. Gunzert later wrote about
Erich von Manstein's actions that It was a flight from responsibility,
a moral failure.
Leningrad
After the capture of Sevastopol the German high command felt
Erich von Manstein was the right man to command the forces
at Leningrad, which had been under siege from autumn the previous
year and the front had been settled into some kind of trench
warfare reminiscent of World War I. Erich von Manstein, with
elements of the 11th Army, was transferred to the Leningrad
front where he arrived at 27 August 1942. Erich von Manstein
again lacked proper forces to storm the city directly, therefore
he planned an operation called Operation Nordlicht, a bold
plan for a thrust to cut off Leningrad's supply line at Lake
Ladoga.
However, on the same day as Erich von Manstein's arrival,
the Soviet launched an offensive of their own. Originally
planned as spoiling attack against Georg Lindemann's 18th
Army in the narrow German salient west of Lake Ladoga, the
offensive suddenly appeared to be able to breakthrough the
German lines, lifting the siege. The superior Soviet forces
were able to push a deep bulge into the German lines. Erich
von Manstein was forced to divert his forces in order to avoid
catastrophe. Erich von Manstein was given control of all German
forces nearby. After a series of heavy battles, Erich von
Manstein launched his own counterattack on 21 September and
was able to cut off the two Soviet armies in the salient.
The next month he was busy clearing the perimeter. Although
the Soviet offensive had been fended off, the resulting attrition
meant that the Germans were no longer able to execute a decisive
assault on Leningrad, and Nordlicht was put on ice. As result,
the siege continued into 1943.
Stalingrad
To resolve the always present shortage of oil, the Germans
had launched a massive offensive aimed against the Caucasian
oilfields in the summer of 1942. To protect the flanks of
the offensive, the Wehrmacht planned to occupy the city of
Stalingrad at the Volga. While the 6th Army, led by
Friedrich
Paulus, still struggled with the Soviet defenders inside
the town, the Soviets launched a counteroffensive against
the flanks of the German forces on 19 November, codenamed
Operation Uranus. As result 6th Army and parts of 4th Panzer
Army were trapped inside the city. 2 days later
Adolf
Hitler appointed Erich von Manstein as commander of the
newly created Heeresgruppe Don (Army Group Don), consisting
of a hastily assembled group of tired men and machines. Erich
von Manstein advised
Adolf
Hitler not to order the 6th Army to break out, stating
that he could successfully break through the Soviet lines
and relief the besieged 6th Army. The American historians'
Williamson Murray and Allan Millet wrote that it was Erich
von Manstein's message to
Adolf
Hitler on November 24th advising him that the 6th Army
should not break out, along with
Hermann
Göring statements that the Luftwaffe could supply
Stalingrad that ... Sealed the fate of Sixth Army. After 1945,
Erich von Manstein falsified the record and claimed that he
told
Adolf
Hitler that the 6th Army must break out. The American
historian Gerhard Weinberg wrote that Because of the sensitivity
of the Stalingrad question in post-war Germany, Erich von
Manstein worked as hard to distort the record on this matter
as on his massive involvement in the murder of Jews. Erich
von Manstein was tasked to conduct a relieve operation, named
Operation Winter Storm (Unternehmen Wintergewitter) against
Stalingrad, which he thought was feasible if the 6th Army
was adequately supplied through the air.
Wintergewitter, launched on 12 December, achieved some initial
success and Erich von Manstein got his three panzer divisions
and supporting units of the 57th Panzer Corps (comprising
the 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 6th and 17th Panzer
Divisions) within 30 miles of Stalingrad by 20 December at
the Myshkova River. Only in mid December 1942 did Erich von
Manstein changed his stance about the wisdom of keeping the
6th Army in Stalingrad, and Erich von Manstein began to urge
Adolf Hitler
that the 6th Army should break out.. Since
Adolf
Hitler was against a breakout of the 6th Army and Erich
von Manstein was reluctant to openly disobey
Adolf
Hitler's orders, he sent his intelligence officer into
the perimeter to persuade
Friedrich
Paulus to order the breakout attempt on his own. However,
Friedrich
Paulus never ordered the breakout, insisting that he has
not enough fuel and ammunition to do so. After the Soviet
resistance grew stronger, Erich von Manstein finally had to
withdraw from his forward positions, leaving the 6th Army
to its fate.
While Erich von Manstein was executing Operation Winterstorm,
the Soviets had launched an offensive by their own, Operation
Saturn. This offensive aimed at capturing Rostov and thus
cutting off the German Heeresgruppe A (Army Group A). However,
after the launch of Winterstorm, the Soviets had to reallocate
forces and the operation was subsequently scaled down and
redubbed Little Saturn. The offensive forced Erich von Manstein
to divert his forces thus avoiding the collapse of the entire
front. The attack also prevented the 48th Panzer Corps (comprising
the 336th Infantry Division, the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division,
and the 11th Panzer Division), under the command of General
Otto von Knobelsdorff, from joining up with the 57th Panzer
Corps as planned to aid the relief effort. Instead, the 48th
Panzer Corps held a line along the River Chir, beating off
successive Russian attacks. General Hermann Balck used the
11th Panzer Division to counterattack Soviet salients At the
verge of collapse, the German units were able to hold the
line, but the Italian 8th army on the flanks was overwhelmed
and subsequently destroyed.
Spurred by this success the Soviets planned a series of follow-up
offensives in January/February 1943 intended to decisively
beat the Germans in southern Russia. After the destruction
of the remaining Hungarian and Italian forces during the Ostrogozhsk
Rossosh Offensive Operation Star and Operation Gallop were
launched to recapture Kharkov, Kursk and to cut off all German
forces east of Donetsk. Those operations succeeded in breaking
through the German lines and threatened the whole southern
part of the German front. To deal with this threat, Heeresgruppe
Don (Army Group Don), Heeresgruppe B (Army Group B) and parts
of Heeresgruppe A (Army Group A) were reunited as Army Group
South (Heeresgruppe Süd) under Erich von Manstein's command
in early February.
Kharkov Operation
During their offensives in February 1943 the Soviets have
succeeded in breaking through the German lines, retaking Kursk
and Kharkov. Despite the Soviet advance, Erich von Manstein
launched a counteroffensive into the overextended Soviet flank
on 21 February 1943. The assault proved a major success Erich
von Manstein's troops advanced rapidly, isolating Soviet forward
units and forcing the Red Army to halt most of its offensive
operations. By 2 March tank spearheads from
Hermann
Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf met,
cutting off large portions of the Soviet Southwest Front,
and by 9 March the Wehrmacht had inflicted a heavy defeat
on the Soviets at Krasnograd and Barvenkovo.
Erich von Manstein then pushed forward, with his effort being
spearheaded by Paul Hausser's 2nd SS Panzer Corps, recapturing
Kharkov on 14 March, after bloody street fighting in what
is known as the Third Battle of Kharkov. In recognition for
this accomplishment, Erich von Manstein received the Oak Leaves
for the Knight's Cross. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps then captured
Belgorod on 21 March. When the offensive finally came to a
halt, the Wehrmacht had dealt heavy damage to the Soviet troops
and blunted their offensives. The successful counterattack
at Kharkov allowed the Wehrmacht to prepare for one last strategic
offensive, named Operation Zitadelle, which would mount into
the Battle of Kursk.
Operation Citadel
During Operation Citadel, Erich von Manstein led the southern
pincer, and despite losses, he managed to achieve most of
his initial goals, inflicting far more casualties than he
sustained. In his memoirs, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who led
the Soviet defence at Kursk, praised Erich von Manstein. But
due to the almost complete failure of the northern sector's
pincer led by
Günther
von Kluge's and
Walther
Model, chronic lack of infantry support and an operational
reserve, as well as Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of
Sicily,
Adolf
Hitler called off the offensive. Erich von Manstein protested,
asserting that the victory was almost at hand as he felt he
had achieved local superiority, and that with a little more
effort, he could crack the Soviet defence before they could
bring up their reserves. The American historians' Williamson
Murray and Allan Millet wrote that By 12 July, only Erich
von Manstein wished to continue the battle. With two relatively
fresh panzer divisions in hand, he argued he could break through
to Kursk. However, Erich von Manstein's claim was wishful
thinking in the face of the depth of Soviet reserves. After
the failure of Citadel, the Soviets launched a massive counterattack
against the exhausted German forces.
A German victory in the sense of annihilating the surrounded
Soviet forces required both the completion of the encirclement
(that is the linking of the northern and southern German pincers)
and holding the encirclement long enough to overcome the encircled
Soviet forces. Even if the first had been accomplished it
does not follow that the second would automatically follow.
The German forces post-Stalingrad were never able to force
the Soviets into significant retreats, except for temporary
reversals like Kharkov. After halting the German offensive
at Kursk, the Soviets had enough strength to launch immediate
counterattacks.
From Kursk to the Dnieper
Erich von Manstein regarded the Battle of Kursk as something
of a German victory as he believed that he had destroyed most
of the Red Army's offensive capacity for the rest of 1943
during the course of that battle. As such, expecting little
in the way of new Soviet offensives in the summer of 1943,
Erich von Manstein moved his panzer reserves to the lower
banks of the Dnieper river to stop a Soviet diversionary offensive
there. It was only in late July 1943 that Erich von Manstein
informed the OKW that his forces as placed on the Donets river
area were holding a too wide area on the flat plains of the
Ukraine and southern Russia with insufficient numbers, and
given this, that he needed to withdrew either to the Dnieper
river or be provided with massive reinforcements to hold the
line on the Donets river, should he be faced with a major
Soviet offensive. On the night of August 3, 1943 a Soviet
offensive struck and placed Erich von Manstein's Army Group
South under heavy pressure at once. This was made worse as
Erich von Manstein's overconfidence about the supposed inability
of the Soviets to mount major offensive operations after Kursk
had led him to place his troops in exposed forward positions
instead of their old defensive positions they had held prior
to Kursk. After two days of heavy fighting, on August 5, 1943
the Soviets broke though Erich von Manstein's lines and reached
a point 60 kilometres behind the German lines and took Belgorod
in the process. In response to Erich von Manstein's pleas
for help,
Adolf
Hitler sent the Grossdeutschland, 7th Panzer, SS 2nd Das
Reich and SS 4th Totenkopf divisions to Army Group South.
However,
Adolf
Hitler refused Erich von Manstein's request to pull back
to the Dnieper, despite the 35-mile hole that the Soviets
had torn into Erich von Manstein's Donets Line, through which
a Soviet front began to move through. As such, Erich von Manstein
waged a series of desperate counter-attacks with his reinforcements
committed in a piecemeal way against the advancing Soviet
forces. Between August 13-17, 1943 a series of armoured battles
took place between the Soviet tank forces and the two SS panzer
divisions outside of Bohodukhiv, which ended in a bloody draw
with both sides equally battered. Erich von Manstein was only
saved when the Soviets threw their main reserves behind a
drive by General Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin who took Kharkov
on the night of August 21-22, 1943. Erich von Manstein took
advantage of this to use the 8th and 4th Panzer Armies to
finally stop the Soviet offensive. Erich von Manstein's triumph
proved to be brief as an offensive by General Konstantin Rokossovsky's
Central Front in September 1943 had severed Heeresgruppe Mitte
(Army Group Centre) from Erich von Manstein's Army Group South,
and severely threatened Erich von Manstein's northern flank.
In light of this threat,
Adolf
Hitler finally allowed Erich von Manstein to withdraw
back to the Dnieper.
Dnieper Campaign
In September 1943, Erich von Manstein withdrew to the west
bank of the river Dnieper in an operation that for the most
part was well-ordered, but at times degenerated into a disorganised
rout as Erich von Manstein's exhausted and defeated soldiers
became unglued. At times, during the retreat, Erich von Manstein
was able inflict heavy casualties on the pursuing Red Army
as such when he smashed two corps of Rodion Malinovsky's army,
which had advanced too far from their supporting units. From
October 1943 to mid-January 1944, Erich von Manstein stabilised
the situation on the Southern Front.
A major factor in the Dnieper campaign was the Soviet use
of maskirovka (deception) which they often used successfully
to fool Erich von Manstein and the other German officers about
their intentions. Murray and Millet wrote that Erich von Manstein
and other German generals' fanatical belief in Nazi racial
theories about the Germans as the herrnvolk (master race)
... Made the idea that Slavs could manipulate German intelligence
with such consistency utterly inconceivable. The Soviets established
a salient from Kiev, and were within reach of the crucial
town of Zhitomir. In late December 1943, Erich von Manstein
started a counteroffensive in the Korosten-Kiev area, in which
he totally destroyed the opposing Soviet forces. Erich von
Manstein counteroffensive saw 1st SS Division Leibstandarte
SS
Adolf Hitler
and 2nd SS Division Das Reich, together with 1st, 7th, 19th,
and 25th Panzer Divisions and 68th Infantry Division (part
of 4th Panzer Army), wheeled around the flank of the Russians
in front of Zhitomir. Several notable victories were won at
Brussilov, Radomyshl, and Meleni, under the guidance of General
Hermann Balck. Balck and his chief of staff had wanted to
attack the base of the salient and go for Kiev, but General
Raus favoured a more prudent approach. This period marked
the beginning of the Erich von Manstein legend as Erich von
Manstein's actions received extensive and very favourable
coverage in the German press, where he was idolised as an
Aryan Übermensch (Superman), a general of superhuman
skill who was effortlessly holding back the Asiatic hordes
of the Red Army. This was the start of the Erich von Manstein
legend that was to reach its full flowering after the war.
Such was the degree of Erich von Manstein's fame that on 10
January 1944 he appeared on the cover of Time magazine, which
was unusual as German generals who fought exclusively on the
Eastern Front rarely received much media interest in the United
States.
The forces that Erich von Manstein destroyed in his counteroffensive
had been placed there as a bait, and were intended to draw
Erich von Manstein's troops out into a trap in a successful
example of maskirovka (through they were not intended to be
destroyed). On December 25, 1943 Vatutin's First Ukrainian
Front sprang the trap when it started in its turn an offensive
that broke through Erich von Manstein's overextended lines
on the Dnieper in a drive towards the cities of Koziatyn and
Berdychiv, thereby threatening to turn Erich von Manstein's
left flank. In the face of the Vatutin's offensive, Erich
von Manstein requested permission to pull back, which was
granted, but
Adolf
Hitler so interfered with the conduct of operations that
Erich von Manstein lacked the necessary operational control
to carry out the withdrawal successfully. On December 28,
1943 Vatutin's troops entered Koziatyn, which was one of Army
Group South's most important supply bases, and during a armoured
battle on the same day knocked out hundreds of German panzers
outside of Koziatyn. On December 31, Valutin's forces entered
Zhytomyr, an important supply hub used by Army Group South.
Valutin's drive ended shortly thereafter at the old Soviet
Polish border. On January 4, 1944 Erich von Manstein met with
Adolf Hitler
to tell him at the Dnieper line was untenable, and that he
needed to retreat in order to save his forces.
In late January 1944, Erich von Manstein was forced to retreat
further westwards by the Soviet offensive. In mid-February
1944, he disobeyed
Adolf
Hitler's order to hold his ground at all costs and ordered
11th and 42nd Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions)
of Army Group South to break out of the Korsun Pocket, which
occurred on 16-17 February 1944. Eventually,
Adolf
Hitler accepted this action and ordered the breakout after
it had already taken place.
Dismissal
Erich von Manstein continued to argue with
Adolf
Hitler about overall strategy on the Eastern Front. Erich
von Manstein advocated an elastic, mobile defence. He was
prepared to cede territory, attempting to make the Soviet
forces either stretch out too thinly or to make them advance
so fast so that their armoured spearheads could be counter-attacked
on the flanks with the goal of encircling and destroying them.
Adolf Hitler
ignored Erich von Manstein's advice and continued to insist
on static warfare all positions held by the Germans were to
be defended to the last man. Because of these frequent disagreements,
Erich von Manstein publicly advocated that
Adolf
Hitler relinquish control over the army and leave the
management of the war to professionals, starting with the
establishment of the position of commander-in-chief in the
East (Oberbefehlshaber Ost).
Adolf
Hitler, however, rejected this idea numerous times, fearing
that it would weaken his hold on power in Germany.
This argument also alarmed some of
Adolf
Hitler's closest associates, such as
Hermann
Göring,
Joseph
Goebbels and the SS chief
Heinrich
Himmler, who were not prepared to give up any of their
powers.
Heinrich
Himmler started to openly question Erich von Manstein's
loyalty and he insinuated to
Adolf
Hitler that Erich von Manstein was an idealist and a defeatist
unsuitable to command troops. Erich von Manstein's frequent
arguing, combined with these allegations, resulted in
Adolf
Hitler relieving Erich von Manstein of his command on
31 March 1944. On 2 April 1944,
Adolf
Hitler appointed
Walther
Model, a firm supporter, as commander of Army Group South
as Erich von Manstein's replacement. Nevertheless, Erich von
Manstein received the Swords for his Knight's Cross, the third
highest German military honour for his military service to
the Wehrmacht. The American historians Allan Millet and Williamson
Murray wrote, After Erich von Manstein became convinced the
Führer would not recall him to save the Reich, he displayed
his grasp of strategy and politics by taking the substantial
honorarium he had received from
Adolf
Hitler as well as the family savings and buying an estate
in East Prussia in October 1944. Later in October 1944 Soviet
forces entered East Prussia, and Erich von Manstein was forced
to abandon his newly purchased estate and flee west.
After his dismissal, Erich von Manstein entered an eye clinic
in Breslau for cataract surgery. He recuperated near Dresden
and then retired from military service all together. Although
he did not take part in the attempt to kill
Adolf
Hitler in July 1944, he had been contacted by Henning
von Tresckow and others in 1943 about the plot. While Erich
von Manstein did agree that change was necessary, he refused
to join them as he still considered himself bound by duty.
He rejected the approaches with the statement: Preussische
Feldmarschälle meutern nicht Prussian Field Marshals
do not mutiny. He also feared that a civil war would ensue.
Though he did not join the plotters, he did not betray them
either. In late January 1945, he collected his family from
their homes in Liegnitz and evacuated them to western Germany.
He surrendered to British Field Marshal Montgomery and was
arrested by British troops on 23 August 1945.
Trial
During the Nuremberg Trials in 1946, Erich von Manstein was
only called as a witness for the defence. Erich von Manstein
was subsequently interned by the British as a prisoner of
war in Special Camp 11 in Bridgend, Wales. Later, because
of pressure from the Soviets, who wanted him extradited to
stand trial in the USSR, the British accepted their indictments
and charged him with war crimes, putting him on trial before
a British Military Tribunal in Hamburg in August 1949. In
part, because of the Soviet demands in the Cold War environment
and respect for his military exploits, many in the British
military establishment, such as Field Marshal Montgomery and
the military strategist Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, openly
expressed sympathy for Erich von Manstein's plight and, along
with the likes of Sir Winston Churchill, donated money for
the defence. Liddell Hart, who was one of Erich von Manstein's
leading admirers portrayed Erich von Manstein as the world's
greatest operational genius in his best-selling 1947 book
On the Other Side of the Hill, which helped to add to the
lustre of Erich von Manstein's name. Erich von Manstein's
trial would led to popularisation of the Wehrmacht myth
In court, Erich von Manstein's defence, led by the prominent
lawyer Reginald Thomas Paget, argued that he had been unaware
that genocide was taking place in the territory under his
control. It was argued that Erich von Manstein did not enforce
the Commissar order, which called for the immediate execution
of Red Army Communist Party commissars. According to his testimony
at the Nuremberg Trials, he received it, but refused to carry
it out. He claimed that his superior at the time, Field Marshal
Wilhelm
Ritter von Leeb, tolerated and tacitly approved of his
choice, and he also claimed that the order was not carried
out in practice. Erich von Manstein had perjured himself when
he claimed that he did not enforce the Commissar Order: documents
from 1941 showed that he passed the Commissar Order to his
subordinates, and that he had suspected commissars shot Erich
von Manstein's lawyer Paget claimed that the only commissars
Erich von Manstein had shot were in the rear area in the Crimea
by police units, likely because of partisan activities.
Erich von Manstein issued an order on 20 November 1941: his
version of Field Marshal
Walther
von Reichenau's infamous Severity Order of 10 October
1941, which equated partisans with Jews and called for their
extermination. Following complaints by some of his officers
about the massacres being committed by Einsatzgruppen, Reicheanu
issued the Severity Order to explain to his men why in his
view the massacres were necessary. Field Marshal
Gerd
von Rundstedt's, the commander of Army Group South and
Reicheanu's superior, upon hearing of the Severity Order expressed
his complete agreement with it, and send out a circular to
all of his generals suggesting that they issue their own versions
of the Severity Order. Erich von Manstein's lawyer Paget claimed
that he had a subordinate write a more moderate version of
the order and he wrote a part himself in which he recommended
lenient treatment of non-Communists in order to secure their
cooperation. This did not apply to the Jewish population,
whom Erich von Manstein equated with Communism, and wanted
to see exterminated. The order stated that::
This struggle is not being carried on against the Soviet Armed
Forces alone in the established form laid down by European
rules of warfare.
Behind the front too, the fighting continues. Partisan snipers
dressed as civilians attack single soldiers and small units
and try to disrupt our supplies by sabotage with mines and
infernal machines. Bolshevist left behind keep the population
freed from Bolshevism in a state of unrest by means of terror
and attempt thereby to sabotage the political and economic
pacification of the country. Harvests and factories are destroyed
and the city population in particular is thereby ruthlessly
delivered to starvation.
Jewry is the middleman between the enemy in the rear and the
remains of the Red Army and the Red leadership still fighting.
More strongly than in Europe they hold all key positions of
political leadership and administration, of trade and crafts
and constitutes a cell for all unrest and possible uprisings.
The Jewish Bolshevik system must be wiped out once and for
all and should never again be allowed to invade our European
living space.
The German soldier has therefore not only the task of crushing
the military potential of this system. He comes also as the
bearer of a racial concept and as the avenger of all the cruelties
which have been perpetrated on him and on the German people....
The soldier must appreciate the necessity for the harsh punishment
of Jewry, the spiritual bearer of the Bolshevik terror. This
is also necessary in order to nip in the bud all uprisings
which are mostly plotted by Jews.
The order also stated: The food situation at home makes it
essential that the troops should as far as possible be fed
off the land and that furthermore the largest possible stocks
should be placed at the disposal of the homeland. Particularly
in enemy cities a large part of the population will have to
go hungry. This also was one of the indictments against Erich
von Manstein in Hamburg not only neglect of civilians, but
also exploitation of invaded countries for the sole benefit
of the homeland, something considered illegal by the then
current laws of war.
The order additionally stated that severe steps will be taken
against arbitrary action and self interest, against savagery
and indiscipline, against any violation of the honour of the
soldier and that respect for religious customs, particularly
those of Muslim Tartars, must be demanded. The German Army
always disapproved of so-called wild shootings where troops
would engage in sessions of indiscriminately shooting people
on their own initiative, and it was normal when issuing orders
calling for violence against civilians to warn against arbitrary
actions. The evidence for this order was first presented by
prosecutor Telford Taylor on 10 August 1946, in Nuremberg.
Erich von Manstein acknowledged that he had signed this order
of 20 November 1941, but claimed that he did not remember
it. The American historians Ronald Smelser and Edward Davies
wrote in 2008 that Erich von Manstein was a vicious anti-Semitic
of the first order who whole-heartily agreed with
Adolf
Hitler's idea that the war against the Soviet Union was
a war to exterminate Judeo-Bolshevism and that was simply
committing perjury when he claimed he could not remember his
version of the to Severity Order. This order was a major piece
of evidence for the prosecution at his Hamburg trial. At this
trial, Paget argued that the order was justified because he
claimed that many partisans were Jews, and so Erich von Manstein's
order calling for every Jewish men, women and child to be
executed was justified by his desire to protect his men from
partisan attacks. In the same way, Paget called the Russians
savages, and argued that Erich von Manstein showed much restraint
as a decent German soldier in allegedly upholding the laws
of war when fighting against the Russians who at all times
displayed the most appalling savagery.
While Paget got Erich von Manstein acquitted of many of the
seventeen charges, he was still found guilty of two charges
and accountable for seven others, mainly for employing scorched
earth tactics and for failing to protect the civilian population,
and was sentenced on 19 December 1949, to 18 years imprisonment
which was near the maximum for the charges that were retained.
This caused a massive uproar among Erich von Manstein's supporters
and the sentence was subsequently reduced to 12 years. As
part of his work championing his client, Paget published a
best-selling book in 1951 about Erich von Manstein's career
and his trial which portrayed Erich von Manstein as an honourable
soldier fighting heroically despite overwhelming odds on the
Eastern Front, who had been convicted of crimes that he did
not commit. Paget's book helped to contribute to the growing
cult around Erich von Manstein's name. However, he was released
on 6 May 1953 for what were officially described as medical
reasons, but was in fact due to strong pressure from the West
German government, who saw Erich von Manstein as a hero.
Erich von Manstein, one of the highest ranking generals in
the Wehrmacht, claimed ignorance of what was happening in
the concentration camps. In the Nuremberg Trials, he was asked
Did you at that time know anything about conditions in the
concentration camps? to which he replied No. I heard as little
about that as the German people, or possibly even less, because
when one was fighting 1,000 kilometres away from Germany,
one naturally did not hear about such things. I knew from
pre-war days that there were two concentration camps, Oranienburg
and Dachau, and an officer who at the invitation of the SS
had visited such a camp told me that it was simply a typical
collection of criminals, besides some political prisoners
who, according to what he had seen, were being treated severely
but correctly. However, Erich von Manstein ignored the massacres
committed in the occupied areas of the Soviet Union by the
Einsatzgruppen who travelled in the wake of the German Army,
including Erich von Manstein's own 11th Army. That Erich von
Manstein was well aware of the Einsatzgruppen massacres is
proven by a 1941 letter he sent to Otto Ohlendorf, where Erich
von Manstein demands Ohlendorf hand over the wrist watches
of murdered Jews, which Erich von Manstein wrote was unfair
since his men were doing so much to help Ohlendorf's men with
their work. Smelser and Davies note that Erich von Manstein's
letter complaining that the SS were keeping all of the wrist
watches of murdered Jews to themselves was the only time that
Erich von Manstein ever complained about the actions of the
Einsatzgruppen in the entire Second World War.
Senior advisor
Called on by the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Erich
von Manstein served as his senior defence advisory and chaired
a military subcommitee appointed to advise the parliament
on military organisation and doctrine for the new German Army,
the Bundeswehr and its incorporation into NATO. He later moved
with his family to Bavaria. His war memoirs, Verlorene Siege
(Lost Victories), were published in Germany in 1955, and translated
into English in 1958. In them, he presented the thesis that
if only he had been in charge of strategy instead of
Adolf
Hitler, the war on the Eastern Front could have been won.
For the most part, Erich von Manstein was disparaging of other
German generals, whom Erich von Manstein portrayed as incompetent.
Erich von Manstein took all credit for German victories for
himself, while blaming
Adolf
Hitler and other generals for every defeat. Above all,
Erich von Manstein singled out for abuse his arch enemy, General
Franz
Halder, whom Erich von Manstein argued understood that
Adolf Hitler's
leadership was defective while lacking the courage to do anything
about it. As for the Red Army, Erich von Manstein portrayed
the average Russian soldier as brave but badly led. Erich
von Manstein depicted the entire Soviet officer corps as hopelessly
incompetent, and portrayed the war on the Eastern Front as
a battle between a German Army that was vastly superior in
fighting ability being steadily ground down by an opponent
that was superior only in numbers. Smelser and Davies wrote
that this aspect of Verlorene Siege was very self-serving
as it allowed Erich von Manstein to ignore several occasions
such as the fall of Kiev in November 1943, where the Stavka
not only tricked him, but defeated him as well. A noteworthy
aspect of Verlorene Siege was Erich von Manstein's avoidance
of political issues, instead treating the entire war as an
operational matter. Erich von Manstein refused to express
any regret for fighting under a genocidal regime, and nowhere
in Verlorene Siege did Erich von Manstein issue any sort of
moral condemnation of National Socialism. Instead,
Adolf
Hitler was only criticised for faulty strategic decisions.
Smelser and Davies wrote that Erich von Manstein's criticism
of
Adolf Hitler
was extremely self-serving as Erich von Manstein made the
false claim that he wanted the 6th Army to be pulled out of
Stalingrad after it was encircled, only to be overruled by
Adolf Hitler,
and Erich von Manstein attacked
Adolf
Hitler for launching Operation Citadel, a plan that Erich
von Manstein himself had developed, although he had urged
it to be executed months earlier before Soviet defences were
built up. Erich von Manstein's lament about Germany's lost
victories in the Second World War seemed to imply that the
world would have been a much better place if Nazi Germany
had won the war. The German historian Volker Berghahn wrote
about Verlorene Siege that: It title gave the story away:
it had been
Adolf
Hitler's dogmatism and constant interference with the
strategic plans and operational decisions of the professionals
that had cost Germany its victory against Stalin. Erich von
Manstein made the entirely false claim that he did not enforce
the Commissar Order, and made no mention of his own considerable
role in the Holocaust, such as sending 2,000 of his soldiers
to help the SS massacre 11,000 Jews in Simferopol in November
1941. Verlorene Siege was much acclaimed and a best-seller
when it was published in the 1950s. The favourable portrait
Erich von Manstein drew of himself in Verlorene Siege continues
to influence the popular picture of him to this day. In 1998,
Jürgen Förster, a German historian, wrote that for
too long most people have accepted at face value the self-serving
claims made by generals like Erich von Manstein and Siegfried
Westphal who promoted the idea of the Wehrmacht in their memoirs
as a highly professional, apolitical force who were victims
of
Adolf Hitler
rather than his followers, which served to distort the subject
of Wehrmacht war crimes. Berghahn wrote in 2004 that Erich
von Manstein's memoirs were totally unreliable, and if more
had been known about Erich von Manstein's war crimes in the
1940s, he might had been hanged. Berghahn wrote that by By
the time Christian Streit published his book Keine Kamaden
about the mass murder of Red Army prisoners of war at the
hands of the Wehrmacht, professional historians firmly accepted
what Erich von Manstein and his comrades had denied and covered
up, i.e., that the Wehrmacht had been deeply involved in the
criminal and genocidal policies of the National Socialist
Regime. Smelser and Davies note that nowhere in his post-war
writings nor memoirs did Erich von Manstein condemn explicitly
National Socialism
Because of his influence, for the first few years of the Bundeswehr
he was seen as the unofficial chief of staff. Even later,
his birthday parties were regularly attended by official delegations
of Bundeswehr and NATO top leaders such as General Hans Speidel
who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied ground forces
in Central Europe from 1957 to 1963. This was not the case
with other Field Marshals such as
Erhard
Milch, Ferdinand Schörner,
Georg
von Küchler and others, who were disregarded and
forgotten after the war. By the mid-19 50s, Erich von Manstein
had become the object of a vast cult centred around him, which
portrayed him as not only as one of Germany's greatest generals,
but also one of the world's greatest generals ever. Erich
von Manstein was described as a militärische Kult- und
Leitfigur (military cult legend), a general of legendary,
almost mythical ability and superhuman skill, much honoured
by both the public and historians.
Erich von Manstein suffered a stroke and died in Munich on
the night of 9 June 1973. He was buried with full military
honours. His obituary in The Times on 13 June 1973, stated
that His influence and effect came from powers of mind and
depth of knowledge rather than by generating an electrifying
current among the troops or 'putting over' his personality.
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