Branch: Heer
Born: 29 June 1880, Nassauische Sparkasse near Biebrich,
Hessen, Germany.
Died: 20 July 1944, Berlin, Germany.
Ranks:
Generaloberst
General der Infanterie
Generalleutnant
Generalmajor
Oberst
Oberstleutnant
Major
Hauptmann
Oberleutnant
Leutnant
Fähnrich
Decorations:
Commands:
Oberkommando des Heeres
Other: Personnel
Articles:
Ludwig August Theodor Beck was a German general and Chief
of the German General Staff during the early years of the
National Socialist Party in Germany before World War II.
Originally a supporter of the Nazis, Ludwig Beck broke with
Adolf Hitler
and eventually became a major leader within the conspiracy
against
Adolf
Hitler. Ludwig Beck would have been provisional head of
state had the 20 July plot succeeded. When the plot failed,
Ludwig Beck chose to commit suicide with a pistol.
Beck's early life and career
Born in Biebrich (now a borough of Wiesbaden, Hesse) in Hessen-Nassau,
Ludwig Beck was educated in the Prussian military tradition.
Ludwig Beck served on the Western Front in World War I as
a staff officer. After the war Ludwig Beck served in various
staff and command appointments. In 1931 1932, Ludwig Beck
led the group of army writers, at the Department of the Army
(Truppenamt) which published the German Army Operations Manual
entitled Truppenführung. The first section was promulgated
in 1933 and the second section in 1934. A modified version
is still in use today by the Federal German Army. Ludwig Beck
was promoted to the rank of Generalleutnant in 1932 and, two
years later, Ludwig Beck replaced General Wilhelm Adam as
chief of the Truppenamt, the camouflaged General Staff (the
Treaty of Versailles explicitly forbade the existence of the
General Staff).
In National Socialist Germany
In September October 1930, Ludwig Beck was a leading defense
witness at the trial in Leipzig of three junior officers,
Lieutenant Richard Scheringer, Hans Friedrich Wendt and Hans
Ludin. The three men were charged with membership in the National
Socialist Party at that time membership in political parties
was forbidden for members of the Reichswehr. The three officers
admitted to National Socialist Party membership, and used
as their defence the claim that the National Socialist Party
membership should not be forbidden to Reichswehr personnel.
When the three officers were arrested after being caught red-handed
distributing National Socialist Party literature at their
base, Ludwig Beck, who was the commanding officer of the 5th
Artillery Regiment based in Ulm, which the three officers
belonged to, was highly furious and argued that since the
National Socialist Party was a force for good that Reichswehr
personnel should not be banned from joining the National Socialist
Party. At the preliminary hearing, Ludwig Beck spoke on behalf
of the three officers. At the Leipzig trial of Ludin and Scheringer,
Ludwig Beck testified as to the good character of the accused,
described the National Socialist Party as a positive force
in German life, and proclaimed his belief that the Reichswehr
ban on National Socialist Party membership in his opinion
should be rescinded. When Lieutenant Scheringer spoke of a
future war in which the National Socialist Party and the Reichswehr
were to fight hand in hand as brothers in a war of liberation
to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles, Ludwig Beck supported
Scheringer by testifying that: The Reichswehr is told daily
that it is an army of leaders. What is a young officer to
understand by that?. Historians such as Sir John Wheeler-Bennett
have noted that Ludwig Beck was deliberately distorting
Hans
von Seeckt's Führerarmee (Army of leaders i.e. training
soldiers to be leaders when the time came to expand the Army
beyond the limits permitted by Versailles) principle by seeking
to apply it to politics. During the course of the 1930 Leipzig
trial, Ludwig Beck first met
Adolf
Hitler who also testified at the trial, and was very favourably
impressed.
In 1933, upon witnessing the National Socialist Machtergreifung,
Ludwig Beck wrote I have wished for years for the political
revolution, and now my wishes have come true. It is the first
ray of hope since 1918. In July 1934, Ludwig Beck expressed
some alarm at National Socialist Party foreign policy involving
Germany in a premature war, after the failed National Socialist
Party putsch in Austria, leading Ludwig Beck to warn that
those in leading positions must understand that foreign adventures
at this time might lead to Germany being forced to make a
humiliating retreat that might in Ludwig Beck's view bring
about the end of National Socialist Germany. In August 1934,
when following the death of President
Paul
von Hindenburg, and
Adolf
Hitler's assumption of the roles of powers of the Presidency,
most notably the position of Commander-in-Chief, Ludwig Beck
wrote that
Adolf
Hitler's move created favourable conditions for the Reichswehr.
Ludwig Beck gained respect with the publication of his tactical
manual, Truppenführung. Both Ludwig Beck and General
Werner
von Fritsch commanded the 1st Cavalry Division, in Frankfurt
an der Oder prior to assuming their command positions. During
his time first as Chief of the Truppenamt (1933 1935), and
then as Chief of the General Staff (1935 1938), Ludwig Beck
encouraged the development of armoured forces, though not
to the extent that advocates of Panzer warfare like
Heinz
Guderian wanted. In Ludwig Beck's conception of power
politics, it was crucial to have German military power restored
to its pre-1919 levels, and from the latter half of 1933,
advocated a level of military spending beyond even those considered
by
Adolf Hitler.
In Ludwig Beck's opinion, once Germany was sufficiently rearmed,
the Reich should wage a series of wars that would establish
Germany as Europe's foremost power, and place all of Central
and Eastern Europe into the German sphere of influence.
As Chief of the General Staff, Ludwig Beck lived in a modest
home in the Lichterfelde suburb of Berlin, and worked normally
from 09:00 to 19:00 every day. As General Staff Chief, Ludwig
Beck was widely respected for his intelligence and work ethic,
but was often criticized by other officers for being too interested
in administrative details. In 1934, Ludwig Beck wrote a lengthy
covering letter to a long report on the British Army armour
maneuvers as a way of encouraging interest in armoured warfare.In
Ludwig Beck's view of the General Staff's role, the War Minister
served in a mere administrative function, and the Chief of
the General Staff should have been able to advise the Reich
leadership directly, views that led to conflicts with the
War Minister, Field Marshal
Werner
von Blomberg, who resented Ludwig Beck's efforts to diminish
his powers. In 1936, Ludwig Beck strongly supported
Adolf
Hitler during the remilitarization of the Rhineland against
Werner
von Blomberg, who feared the French reaction to such a
move. By the end of 1937 and the beginning of 1938, Ludwig
Beck had come into increasing conflict with other officers
over the place and importance of the General Staff in the
German military hierarchy, in which Ludwig Beck wished to
have all of the important decision-making moved into the arms
of the General Staff.
Starting in the mid-1930s, Ludwig Beck created his own intelligence
network comprising German military attaches, which Ludwig
Beck used both to collect information, and to leak information.
Besides military attaches, Ludwig Beck also recruited civilians
for his private intelligence network, of which the most notable
volunteer was Carl Goerdeler.
In May 1937, Ludwig Beck refused an order to draw up orders
for executing Fall Otto (Case Otto), the German plan for an
invasion of Austria under the grounds that such a move might
cause a world war before Germany was ready for such a war.
During the Anschluss of February March 1938, once Ludwig Beck
was convinced that no war would result from a move against
Austria, Ludwig Beck swiftly drew up the orders for Fall Otto.
In Ludwig Beck's conception of power politics, war was a necessary
part of restoring Germany to Great Power status provided that
these wars were limited in scope and Germany possessed sufficient
strength and had sufficiently strong allies.
During the
Werner
von Blomberg-
Werner
von Fritsch Crisis of early 1938, Ludwig Beck saw a chance
to reassert the interests and power of the Army against what
Ludwig Beck regarded as the excessive power of the SS.The
ending of the crisis in favor of the SS left Ludwig Beck somewhat
disillusioned.
Beck's conflict with Adolf Hitler
Ludwig Beck resented
Adolf
Hitler for his efforts to curb the army's position of
influence. Ludwig Beck tried very early as Chief of the General
Staff to deter
Adolf
Hitler from using the grievances of the Sudetenland region
of Czechoslovakia, the population of which was mostly ethnic-German,
as an excuse for war against the latter state in 1938.
Ludwig Beck had no moral objection to the idea of war of aggression
to eliminate Czechoslovakia as a state. In 1935, Ludwig Beck
had a series of meetings with Prince Bernard von Bülow,
the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office and the Chief
of the Hungarian General Staff to discuss plans for the division
of Czechoslovakia. On 12 November 1937, Ludwig Beck submitted
a memorandum stating that various facts show the requirement
for an imminent solution by force of the problem of Czechoslovakia
and that it was desirable to start preparing the political
ground among those powers which stood on our side or who were
not against us, and that the military discussion in either
the one case or the other should begin at once.
However, Ludwig Beck felt that Germany needed more time to
rearm before starting such a war. In Ludwig Beck's assessment,
the earliest date Germany could risk a war was 1940, and any
war started in 1938 would be a premature war that Germany
would lose. In the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937,
Adolf
Hitler had expressed his belief that Britain and France
would not intervene in the event of German aggression against
Austria and Czechoslovakia, a conviction strengthened by the
Anschluss earlier in the year, and they would not stand in
his way if Ludwig Beck should try again to enlarge the Reich.
Ludwig Beck, however, believed that the French would honor
the terms of the Franco-Czechoslovak alliance of 1924, and
that, should France go to war with Germany, Britain would
then almost certainly enter the war on the Allied side. Ludwig
Beck also felt that Germany did not have the raw materials
to fight a European war.
While most of the generals felt the idea of starting a war
in 1938 was highly risky, none of them would confront
Adolf
Hitler with a refusal to carry out orders, since the majority
opinion was that Ludwig Beck's arguments against war in 1938
were flawed. From May 1938, Ludwig Beck had bombarded
Adolf
Hitler,
Wilhelm
Keitel and
Walther
von Brauchitsch with memoranda opposing Fall Grün
(Case Green), the plan for a war with Czechoslovakia. In the
first of his memos, on 5 May 1938, Ludwig Beck argued that
the Sino-Japanese War meant Japan would be unable to come
to Germany's aid, that the French Army was the best fighting
force in Europe, and that Britain was certain to intervene
on the side of France should Germany attack Czechoslovakia.
In his May memo, Ludwig Beck argued that
Adolf
Hitler's assumptions about France, made in the Hossbach
Memorandum of 1937, were mistaken, and stated his belief that
France wishes for peace or, perhaps more accurately, abhors
a new war, but that in case of a real threat, or what is perceived
by the people to be foreign policy pressure, the French nation
comes together as if one. Ludwig Beck stated in the same memo
that
Adolf
Hitler was wrong about France being on the verge of civil
war and that, in the event of a German threat to Czechoslovakia,
the French would see such a threat as a question of honour...for
which a strong government will have no difficulty pulling
itself together. Ludwig Beck stated his belief that The French
army is and remains intact and is at the moment the strongest
in Europe. Ludwig Beck ended his memo with the comments that:
The military-economic situation of Germany is bad, worse than
in 1917 1918. In its current military, military-political
and military-economic condition, Germany cannot expose itself
to the risk of a long war. The May Crisis of May 21 22, 1938
further convinced Ludwig Beck of the dangers of going to war
in 1938, and led him to increase his efforts to stop a war
that Ludwig Beck felt Germany could not win. In November 1938,
Ludwig Beck informed a friend that, from the time of the May
Crisis, the only consideration in his mind was How can I prevent
a war?.
On 22 May 1938,
Adolf
Hitler stated that, though he had deep respect for Ludwig
Beck for his pro-National Socialist testimony at the Ulm trial
of 1930, his views were too much that of a Reichswehr general,
and not enough of a Wehrmacht general.
Adolf
Hitler commented that Ludwig Beck was one of the officers
still imprisoned in the idea of the hundred-thousand-man army.
On 28 May 1938, Ludwig Beck had a meeting with
Adolf
Hitler, the Foreign Minister
Joachim
von Ribbentrop, Admiral
Erich
Raeder,
Hermann
Göring,
Wilhelm
Keitel, and
Walther
von Brauchitsch, during which
Adolf
Hitler restated the views he had first expressed in the
Hossbach Memorandum. In response, Ludwig Beck drafted another
memo on May 29, in which Ludwig Beck presented a case that
the Czechoslovak Army was not, as
Adolf
Hitler argued, a weak force, and that a limited regional
war in Central Europe was not a realistic possibility. In
the same memo of 29 May, Ludwig Beck proclaimed his agreement
with
Adolf
Hitler's views about the necessity of acquiring Lebensraum
in Eastern Europe, called the existence of Czechoslovakia
intolerable, and concluded that a way must be found to eliminate
it (Czechoslovakia) as a threat to Germany, even, if necessary,
by war. However, Ludwig Beck argued that Germany was not strong
enough to fight the general war that would result from an
attack on Czechoslovakia in 1938, and urged
Adolf
Hitler to avoid a premature war. In particular, Ludwig
Beck argued that It is not accurate to judge Germany today
as stronger than in 1914, and Ludwig Beck presented a detailed
military case that more time was needed before the Wehrmacht
would be as strong as the Army of 1914. Furthermore, Ludwig
Beck contended that he could not accept these estimates of
the military power of France and England...Germany, whether
alone or in alliance with Italy, is not in a position militarily
to match England or France.
At first, Ludwig Beck felt that
Adolf
Hitler's rush to war in 1938 was not caused by the Führer's
personality, but was rather caused by
Adolf
Hitler receiving poor military advice, especially from
Wilhelm
Keitel. As a result, Ludwig Beck spent much of his time
urging a reorganization of the command structure, so that
Adolf Hitler
would receive his advice from the General Staff, and presumably
abandon his plans for aggression. In one of his memos opposing
war in 1938, Ludwig Beck commented: Once again, the comments
of the Führer demonstrate the complete inadequacy of
the current top military-advisory hierarchy. What is needed
is continual, competent advising of the commander-in-chief
of the Wehrmacht on questions of war leadership and above
all on weapons of war, with clear delineation of responsibilities.
If steps are not taken soon to produce a change in conditions,
which have grown intolerable if the current anarchy becomes
a permanent condition then the future destiny of the Wehrmacht
in peace and war, indeed the destiny of Germany in a future
war, must be painted in the blackest of colors. Only in June
1938 did Ludwig Beck realize that it was
Adolf
Hitler who was behind the drive for war, and, in a memo
to
Walther
von Brauchitsch, urge that all of the senior officers
threaten a mass collective resignation to force
Adolf
Hitler to abandon his plans for Fall Grün in 1938.
Ludwig Beck ended his appeal to
Walther
von Brauchitsch.
Now at stake are final decisions regarding the fate of the
nation. History will burden those leaders with blood guilt
if they do not act according to their professional and statesmanly
principles and knowledge. Their soldierly loyalty must end
at the boundary where their knowledge, conscience, and sense
of responsibility forbid the execution of an order. In case
their advice and warnings fall on deaf ears in such circumstances,
then they have the right and the duty, before the people and
history, to resign their offices. If they all act together,
then it will be impossible to carry out military action. They
will thereby save the Fatherland from the worst, from total
ruin. If a soldier in a position of highest authority in such
times see his duties and tasks only within the limits of his
military responsibilities, without consciousness of his higher
responsibility to the whole people, then he shows a lack of
greatness, a lack of comprehension of responsibility. Extraordinary
times demand extraordinary actions!
On 16 July 1938, Ludwig Beck wrote a memo stating that the
Army might have to resolve unspecified internal political
problems. Ludwig Beck's campaign for a mass resignation was
not aimed at the overthrow of
Adolf
Hitler, but was rather intended to persuade
Adolf
Hitler to abandon his plans for war in 1938, and to purge
certain radical elements from the National Socialist Party,
who Ludwig Beck believed to have a negative influence on
Adolf
Hitler. Together with the Abwehr chief, Admiral
Wilhelm
Canaris, and the German Foreign Office's State Secretary,
Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, Ludwig Beck was a leader
of the anti-war group in the German government, which was
determined to avoid a war in 1938 that it felt Germany would
lose. This group was not necessarily committed to the overthrow
of the regime, but was loosely allied to another, more radical
group, the anti-National Socialist fraction centered around
Colonel Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to
use the crisis as an excuse for executing a putsch to overthrow
the National Socialists. The divergent aims between these
two factions produced considerable tensions.
In a June 1938 Generalstabsreise (General Staff study), Ludwig
Beck concluded that Germany could defeat Czechoslovakia, but
that to do so would leave western Germany empty of troops,
thus potentially allowing the French to seize the Rhineland
with little difficulty. Ludwig Beck maintained that Czechoslovak
defences were very formidable, that Prague could mobilize
at least 38 divisions, and that at least 30 German divisions
would be needed to break through, requiring at a minimum a
three week-long campaign. Ludwig Beck concluded that
Adolf
Hitler's assumptions about a limited war in 1938 were
mistaken, and that he felt as fateful, the military action
against Czechoslovakia, planned on the basis of these military
premises, and must explicitly disavow any responsibility of
the general staff of the Army for such action.In July 1938,
upon being shown Ludwig Beck's 5 May 1938 memo opposing Fall
Grün by
Walther
von Brauchitsch,
Adolf
Hitler called Ludwig Beck's arguments kindische Kräfteberechnungen
(childish calculations). In another memo of July 1938, Ludwig
Beck contended that a war with Czechoslovakia, France and
Britain could only end in Germany's defeat, and urged
Adolf
Hitler to postpone his plans for aggression until such
a time as Germany was strong enough for such a war. In late
July 1938,
Erich
von Manstein, a leading protégé of Ludwig
Beck's, wrote to his mentor urging him to stay at his post,
and place his faith in
Adolf
Hitler. On 29 July, Ludwig Beck wrote a memo stating the
German Army had the duty to prepare for possible wars with
foreign enemies and for an internal conflict which need only
take place in Berlin. The July 29 memo is normally considered
the start of Ludwig Becks efforts to overthrow the National Socialist Party.
At the beginning of August 1938, Ludwig Beck wrote a speech
for
Walther
von Brauchitsch to read before
Adolf
Hitler stating the Army's opposition to the premature
war likely to be triggered by Fall Grün, which, however,
Walther
von Brauchitsch chose not to deliver. In August 1938,
Ludwig Beck suggested to General Walther von Brauchitsch that
a house-cleaning of the National Socialist Party was necessary, under which
the influence of the SS be reduced, but
Adolf
Hitler would continue as dictator. At an 10 August summit
the leading generals of the Reich,
Adolf
Hitler spent much of the time attacking Ludwig Beck's
arguments against Fall Grün, and won the majority of
the generals over. Colonel General Ludwig Beck resigned alone
on 18 August, and left office on 27 August. Ludwig Beck was
replaced, as head of the General Staff, by General
Franz
Halder. At
Adolf
Hitler's request, Ludwig Beck kept his resignation secret,
and thus nullified the protest value of his resignation.
Adolf
Hitler promised Ludwig Beck that if he kept his resignation
secret, he would be rewarded with a major field command, and
Ludwig Beck was much disillusioned when he was instead put
on the retired list. Ludwig Beck ceased to have any meaningful
influence on German military affairs, and increasingly came
to rely upon contacts with the British in the hope that London
would successfully exert its influence on
Adolf
Hitler, where he had failed to, through threats and warnings.
His opposition to
Adolf
Hitler brought him in contact with a small number of senior
officers intent on deposing the dictator. Some of them, including
Carl Goerdeler and Ulrich von Hassell, would take part in
the July 20 plot in 1944.
Ludwig Beck and his conspirators knew that Germany faced certain
and rapid defeat if France and Great Britain came to the Czechs'
aid in 1938. Accordingly, they contacted the British Foreign
Office, informed Britain of their plot, and asked for a firm
British warning to deter
Adolf
Hitler from attacking Czechoslovakia. In September 1938,
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French President
Édouard Daladier and Italian dictator Benito Mussolini
signed the Munich Agreement, compelling Czechoslovakia to
give up the Sudetenland, which put an end to the crisis, and
hence Ludwig Beck's efforts at a putsch.
In the autumn of 1939, Ludwig Beck was in contact with certain
Germany Army officers, politicians, and civil servants, including
General
Franz
Halder, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Carl Goerdeler, Admiral
Wilhelm
Canaris, and Colonel Hans Oster about the possibility
of staging a putsch to overthrow the National Socialist Party.
By this time, Ludwig Beck had come to accept that it was not
possible to overthrow the National Socialist Party while keeping
Adolf Hitler
in power. In the event of the putsch being successful, Germany
was to be governed by a triumvirate of Ludwig Beck, Goerdeler
and Schacht who would negotiate a peace with Britain and France
that would allow Germany to keep most of the National Socialist
conquests made up until that time, including Austria, all
of western Poland, and the Reich Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.
In January February 1940, a series of meetings between Goerdeler,
Ludwig Beck, Hassell and Johannes Popitz produced agreement
that when the National Socialist Party was overthrown that
Ludwig Beck was to head the Council of Regency that would
govern Germany. In 1940 1941, Ludwig Beck spent much time
discussing together with Goerdeler, Hassell, and Erwin von
Witzleben certain aspects of the new proposed state after
the successful overthrowing of the National Socialist Party.
Beck's involvement with the 20 July plot
In 1943, Ludwig Beck planned two abortive attempts to kill
Adolf Hitler
by means of a bomb. In May 1944, a memorandum by Field Marshal
Erwin
Rommel made it clear that his participation in the proposed
putsch was based on the precondition that Ludwig Beck serve
as the head of state in the new government. In 1944, Ludwig
Beck was one of the driving forces of the 20 July plot with
Carl Goerdeler and Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg. It was
proposed that Ludwig Beck would become the head of the provisional
government that would assume power in Germany after
Adolf
Hitler had been eliminated. The plot failed, however,
and by the next morning according to the account by Fabian
von Schlabrendorff Ludwig Beck was in the custody of General
Friedrich
Fromm, and Ludwig Beck offered to commit suicide (accept
the consequences). His last words were I am thinking of earlier
times. Ludwig Beck then shot himself. In severe distress,
Ludwig Beck succeeded only in severely wounding himself, and
a sergeant was brought in to administer the coup de grâce
by shooting Ludwig Beck in the back of the neck.
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